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SELECTION PROBLEMS IN LARGE DEVIATIONS IN GAMES
UNDER THE LOGIT CHOICE PROTOCOL
HUNG V. TRAN
In memory of William H. Sandholm
Abstract. We study large deviations in coordination games under the logit
choice protocol. A major open question that [10, 11] posed is whether large
deviations properties under the small noise double limit and the large population
double limit are identical or not. We rephrase this open question in the PDE
language as some selection problems, and we provide some definitive answers to
these problems.
1. Introduction
1.1. The general setting. We first give a brief discussion of optimal control prob-
lems with semilinear running costs and state constraints considered in [10, 12]. Let
n,m ∈ N be such that m ≤ n. Let X ⊂ Rn be a closed m-dimensional polytope.
Let TX denote the set of tangent vectors from points in the relative interior X◦ of
X . If X is n-dimensional, then TX = Rn; more generally, if the affine hull of X
is a translation of a subspace Y ⊂ Rn, then TX = Y . In what follows, topological
statements are made with respect to the relative topology on X ; for example, we
will refer to X◦ as the interior of X . Likewise, derivatives of functions f : X → Rm
will be understood as maps Df : X → L(TX,Rm) from X to linear functions from
TX to Rm.
Let TX(x) = {t(y − x) : y ∈ X, t ≥ 0} ⊆ TX be the tangent cone of X at x.
Here, TX(x) is the set of feasible controls at state x, though as we note shortly, it
will be enough to restrict attentions to controls in a compact subset of TX(x).
We assume that the running cost function L : X × TX → [0,+∞] takes a semi-
linear form. Specifically, we assume that for a given Lipschitz continuous function
Ψ: X → [0,∞)n, we have
L(x, v) =


n∑
i=1
Ψi(x) [vi]+ if v ∈ TX(x),
+∞ otherwise.
(1.1)
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Here, [vi]+ = max{vi, 0} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, the constraint that the state remain
in X is built into the definition of running costs. We also say that L is our given
Lagrangian.
For T > 0, let ΦT be the set of Lipschitz continuous paths φ : [0, T ]→ X , and let
Φ =
⋃
T≥0ΦT . Then the path cost function c : Φ→ R+ is defined by
c(φ) =
∫ T
0
L(φ(t), φ˙(t)) dt when φ ∈ ΦT . (1.2)
The source problem for a given compact set X0 ⊂ X is that of finding the minimal
cost of reaching each state in X from a free initial condition in X0. The value
function for the source problem for X0 is, for x ∈ X ,
W (x) = inf {c(φ) : φ ∈ ΦT for some T ≥ 0, φ(0) ∈ X0, φ(T ) = x}. (SP)
Likewise, the target problem for a given compact set Z ⊂ X is that of finding the
minimal cost of reaching a free state in Z from initial condition x ∈ X . The value
function for the target problem for Z is
V (x) = inf {c(φ) : φ ∈ ΦT for some T ≥ 0, φ(0) = x, φ(T ) ∈ Z}. (TP)
Remark 1. It follows immediately from the semilinearity of the running cost func-
tion (1.1) that the cost of a path does not depend on the speed at which it is
traversed: if φ ∈ ΦT and φˆ ∈ ΦTˆ for some T, Tˆ > 0 differ only by a reparameteriza-
tion of time, then c(φ) = c(φˆ). Because of this, the solutions to problems (SP) and
(TP) do not change if we restrict the control variable u to a compact convex set
whose conical hull is TX . Viewed through the prism of feedback controls, semilin-
earity implies that we need only determine the optimal directions of motion from
each state; the speed of motion in an optimal direction is irrelevant.
We take advantage of this property by introducing a convenient restriction on
the control variable. Let | · | denote the ℓ1 norm on R
n, so that |u| =
∑n
i=1 |ui|.
For r > 0, let Br = {u ∈ R
n : |u| ≤ r} be the closed ball of radius r on Rn.
The foregoing discussion shows that in solving (SP) and (TP), there is no loss in
restricting attention to paths φ ∈ Φ with φ˙(t) ∈ Br for almost all t ≥ 0 for any
fixed r > 0. To take advantage of this, we replace the running cost function (1.1)
with one in which controls outside of Br are infeasible:
L(x, v) =


n∑
i=1
Ψi(x) [vi]+ if v ∈ TX(x) ∩Br,
+∞ otherwise.
(1.3)
For v ∈ Rn, we define the componentwise positive part function [v]+ by ([v+])i =
[vi]+, and we define [v]− analogously. Using this notation, we can write the first
case of (1.3) concisely as
L(x, v) = Ψ(x) · [v]+ if v ∈ TX(x) ∩Br. (1.4)
Set Y = TX . Let H : X × Y → R denote the corresponding Hamiltonian
H(x, u) = max
v∈Y ∩Br
(u · v − L(x, v)) = max
v∈Y ∩Br
(u · v −Ψ(x) · [v]+) . (1.5)
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As usual, H(x, ·) is the Legendre transform (convex conjugate) of L(x, ·). Let
‖Ψ‖∞ = maxx∈X |Ψ(x)| denote the L
∞ norm of Ψ. Thanks to formula (1.5), H(x, ·)
satisfies the following linear lower bound:
H(x, u) ≥
r
n
|u| − r‖Ψ‖∞. (1.6)
This gives us that H is uniformly coercive on X , that is,
lim
|u|→∞
min
x∈X
H(x, u) = +∞.
Here are some of the main results obtained in [12]. We say that a function
V : X → R is maximal with respect to given properties if for any other function
V0 : X → R satisfying the properties, we have V0 ≤ V on X .
Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 characterize the solutions to the source and target problems
in terms of subsolutions in the almost everywhere sense. These inequalities are
only required to hold almost everywhere, and in particular need not be checked at
boundary states ∂X , or at states where the candidate function is not differentiable.
Theorem 1.1. The solution to the source problem (SP) is the maximal Lipschitz
continuous function W : X → R satisfying{
H(x,DW (x)) ≤ 0 for almost all x ∈ X◦;
W (x∗) = 0 for all x∗ ∈ X0.
(1.7)
Theorem 1.2. The solution to the target problem (TP) is the maximal Lipschitz
continuous function V : X → R satisfying{
H(x,−DV (x)) ≤ 0 for almost all x ∈ X◦;
V (y∗) = 0 for all y∗ ∈ Z.
(1.8)
We only state a verification theorem for the target problem; the statement for
the source problem is similar.
Theorem 1.3. Suppose that V : X → R is Lipschitz continuous that satisfies (1.8),
and V (y∗) = 0 for all y∗ ∈ Z. In addition, suppose that for each x ∈ X \Z, there is
a time T > 0 and a path φ ∈ ΦT with φ(0) = x and φ(T ) ∈ Z such that V (x) = c(φ).
Then, V is the solution to (TP).
Hamilton-Jacobi equations with state-constraint boundary conditions were first
studied in [13]. See also [5, 2]. The cost function (1.2) here does not have a
discount factor, which results in the fact that (1.7) and (1.8) are not monotone
in the unknowns. In general, (1.7) and (1.8) have many solutions; for example, 0
is always a solution to both as H(x, 0) = 0 for all x ∈ X . This naturally leads
us to consider the notion of maximal solutions as stated in Theorems 1.1 and 1.2.
Since p 7→ H(x, p) is convex and coercive, it is important emphasizing that, for a
Lipschitz continuous function V , V is an almost everywhere subsolution to (1.7) if
and only if V is its viscosity subsolution (see [14, Chapter 2]). We chose to state
the subsolutions in Theorems 1.1 and 1.2 in the almost everywhere way to make
the statements simpler.
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The verification theorem (Theorem 1.3) allows us to make some intelligent guesses
to find explicit solutions and optimal paths for both (SP) and (TP) in some large
deviations in evolutionary game theory problems [12]. See also [1] for some new
applications.
1.2. Large deviations in coordination games and the logit choice protocol.
We provide here a brief description of large deviations in coordination games and
the logit choice protocol (see [4, 7, 10, 12] for more details).
Let e1, e2, . . . , en, the standard basis of R
n, be n given equilibria. Denote by
X =
{
x1e1 + x2e2 + · · ·+ xnen : xi ≥ 0 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
n∑
i=1
xi = 1
}
.
Then,
Y = TX = Rn0 =
{
u ∈ Rn :
n∑
i=1
ui = 0
}
.
Consider a class of Markov chains {XN,ηk }
∞
k=0 parametrized by a population of size
N ∈ N and a noise level η > 0, which run on discrete grids XN of mesh size 1
N
in
the simplex X . These Markov chains describe the evolution of aggregate behavior
in the given population of N strategically interacting agents. Each agent adjusts
his/her actions over time by following a noisy best response rule, under which the
probabilities of choosing suboptimal actions vanish at exponential rates in 1
η
. Here,
each agent chooses action from the common finite action set A = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The
population’s aggregate behavior is described by a population state x ∈ XN ⊂ X ,
with x =
∑n
i=1 xiei, where xi represents the fraction of the population playing
strategy i. In the class of games to be discussed, the Markov chains typically
approach and then remain near pure states e1, . . . , en corresponding to strict Nash
equilibria, but the ergodicity of these processes ensure that transitions between
such states must occur. Large deviations results were developed in [10] to describe
the waiting times until and likely paths of transitions between those strict Nash
equilibria. Then, the analysis in [10, 12] concerns the small noise double limit,
meaning that the noise level η is first taken to zero, and then the population size N to
infinity. Large deviation properties of {XN,ηk }
∞
k=0 are described in terms of solutions
to optimal control problems with semilinear running costs and state constraints,
and these are precisely where Theorems 1.1–1.3 play essential roles.
Let us be more specific. Consider A ∈ Rn×n, and we use superscripts to refer to
rows of A, and subscripts to refer to its columns. More precisely, Ai is the i-th row
of A, Aj is the j-th column of A, and A
i
j is the (i, j)-th entry. Denote by
Ai−j = Ai−Aj = (ei−ej)
′A, Ai−jk−l = A
i
k−A
i
l−A
j
k+A
j
l = (ei−ej)
′A(ek−el).
Agents are matched against all opponents to play a symmetric two-player normal
form game A given here, with Aij is the payoff that an agent playing i obtains when
matched against an agent playing j. During such a matching, the payoff obtained
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by the action i player is
∑
j A
i
jxj = A
ix. State x∗ ∈ X is a Nash equilibrium of A
if all strategies in use at x∗ are optimal, that is,
Aix∗ = max
1≤j≤n
Ajx∗ whenever x∗i > 0.
Nash equilibria can be characterized in terms of best-response regions. For 1 ≤ i ≤
n, the best-response region for strategy i is defined as
Bi =
{
x ∈ X : Ai−jx = Aix−Ajx ≥ 0 for all 1 ≤ j ≤ n
}
,
in which action i is optimal. The set Bij = Bi ∩ Bj is the boundary between the
best-response regions for strategies i and j. It is clear that x∗ is a Nash equilibrium
if x∗ ∈ Bi whenever x∗i > 0. We study the normal form game A, which is always a
coordination game, that is,
Aii > A
j
i for i 6= j.
This means that if the opponent plays i, then it is best playing i as well. In
coordination games, each pure state ei is a Nash equilibrium for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
In the discrete stochastic model, each agent randomly receives some chances to
revise their actions by applying a noisy best response protocol ση : Rn → X◦ with
noise level η > 0, a function that maps payoffs vectors in Rn to probabilities of
choosing each action. For a payoffs vector π ∈ Rn, the probability of choosing to
play action j is given by σηj (π). The logit choice protocol (see [4]) is given by
σηj (π) =
e
pij
η∑n
k=1 e
pik
η
The suboptimal actions surely have vanishing probabilities as noise level η → 0,
which are captured by the unlikelihood function Υ : Rn → [0,∞)n as
Υj(π) = − lim
η→0
η log σηj (π) = max
1≤i≤n
πi − πj ,
which is piecewise linear.
Let
Ψ(x) = Ax for all x ∈ X.
Then Υj(Ax) = max1≤i≤nA
ix − Ajx. In particular, for x ∈ Bi, Υi(Ax) = 0, and
Υj(Ax) = A
i−jx. As computed in [10, 12], the Hamiltonian H : X × Y → R has
the following formula
H(x, u) = max
i,j
(uj −Υj(Ax)− ui) ∨ 0.
The value functions are typically piecewise quadratic in the explicitly computable
examples (see [10, 12] and the references therein).
Another very important direction concerns with the large population double limit,
meaning that the population size N is first taken to infinity, then the noise level η
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is taken to zero. As computed in [11], for each noise level η > 0, as N → ∞, the
formula of the corresponding Hamiltonian Hη : X × Y → R is
Hη(x, u) = η log

∑
i,j
xie
uj−ui
η
e
Ajx
η∑
k e
Akx
η


We see that Hη(x, 0) = 0 for all x ∈ X , and u 7→ Hη(x, u) is convex. Moreover,
Hη → H locally uniformly in X◦ × Y as η → 0. It is worth noting however that
we do not have that Hη → H locally uniformly on X × Y as η → 0. In fact, as we
will see, Hη behaves badly near the boundary of X , and in particular, Hη is not
uniformly coercive on X . See Section 3.
Since Hη has quite complicated formula and behavior, value functions correspond-
ing to Hη and the optimal paths are typically not tractable when n ≥ 3. Besides,
it was shown in [11] that the Lagrangian Lη(x, ·), Legendre’s transform of Hη(x, ·),
is unbounded and is discontinuous in certain directions as x→ ∂X .
1.3. Some open problems. Let
Z = X \ B1 = B2 ∪ · · · ∪ Bn,
that is, Z is the closure of X \ B1, be the target set. We are concerned with the
target problem (TP) with this given Z. A major open question that [10, 11] posed
is whether the small noise double limit (η → 0, N →∞ in this order) and the large
population double limit (N →∞, η → 0 in this order) give the same result or not.
In other words, one is concerned whether large deviations properties under the two
orders of limits are identical or not. See the discussion with further details in [10,
Section 8]. For some earlier works for the case n = 2, see [3, 8, 9].
In light of Theorems 1.1 and 1.2, we are able to phrase this open question in the
PDE language as follows. For each η > 0, let V η be the maximal locally Lipschitz
continuous solution to{
Hη(x,−DV η(x)) ≤ 0 for almost all x ∈ X◦;
V η(x∗) = 0 for all x∗ ∈ Z.
(1.9)
As Hη(x, 0) = 0 for all x ∈ X , we see that V η ≥ 0.
Question 1. Let Z = X \ B1. Let V be the solution to (TP). For each η > 0, let
V η be the maximal locally Lipschitz continuous solution to (1.9). As η → 0, do we
have V η → V uniformly on X?
As noted above, we only have the convergence of Hη to H locally uniformly in
X◦×Y , but not up to the boundary of X . When n ≥ 3, the situation becomes much
more complicated because of the topology of X . In particular, one can approach
∂X in various different ways, which make the analysis quite hard and delicate. This
leads us to the idea of restricting the convergence problem to compact subsets of
X◦. For r > 0 sufficiently small, denote by
yi = (1− (n− 1)r)ei +
∑
j 6=i
rej for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
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Let Xr be the convex hull of {y1, y2, . . . , yn}. We write yi = yi(r) for 1 ≤ i ≤ n if
needed to demonstrate the clear dependence on r. We now restrict our PDEs to Xr
instead of X .
Xr
e1
e2 e3
y1
y2 y3
Figure 1.1. The simplexes X and Xr in case n = 3
Let Vr be the maximal Lipschitz continuous solution to{
H(x,−DVr(x)) ≤ 0 for almost all x ∈ X
◦
r ;
Vr(x
∗) = 0 for all x∗ ∈ Z.
(1.10)
For η > 0, let V ηr be the maximal Lipschitz continuous solution to{
Hη(x,−DV ηr (x)) ≤ 0 for almost all x ∈ X
◦
r ;
V ηr (x
∗) = 0 for all x∗ ∈ Z.
(1.11)
Question 2. Let Z = X \ B1. Fix r > 0 sufficiently small. Let Vr be the maximal
Lipschitz continuous solution to (1.10). For each η > 0, let V ηr be the maximal
Lipschitz continuous solution to (1.11). As η → 0, do we have V ηr → Vr uniformly
on Xr?
As far as the author is aware of, both Questions 1 and 2 have not been answered
in the literature in general. In the PDE language, Questions 1 and 2 are of selection
problem type as the limiting equations (1.8) and (1.10) have many solutions, and it
is not clear at all if {V η} and {V ηr } converge to the corresponding maximal solutions
as η → 0.
1.4. Main results. We first give an affirmative answer to Question 1 when n = 2.
This was already done in [8], which uses birth-death chain methods to show that in
the two-action case, large deviations properties under the two orders of limits are
identical.
Theorem 1.4. Let n = 2, and Z = X \ B1 = B2. Let V be the solution to (TP).
For each η > 0, let V η be the maximal Lipschitz continuous solution to (1.9). Then,
V η → V uniformly on X as η → 0.
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Xr
B1
e1
e2 e3
Figure 1.2. An example of target set Z (gray region) and Xr
It is worth noting that when n = 2, we are in the one dimensional setting, in
which we have explicit formulas for V η and V . We can then utilize these formulas
to obtain the convergence result rather straightforwardly. This is surely not the
case for n ≥ 3.
Next, we consider the general case. Firstly, we show that (1.10) is a good approx-
imation of the target problem (TP).
Theorem 1.5. Let Z = X \ B1, and V be the solution to (TP). For each r > 0
sufficiently small, let Vr be the maximal Lipschitz continuous solution to (1.10). As
r → 0, Vr → V locally uniformly in X
◦.
This shows that theoretically and also practically, it makes sense to consider
the problems in a restricted simplex Xr and pass to the limit if necessary. It is
worth noting that (TP) keeps all of its characteristics and properties in Xr. For
state-constraint Hamilton-Jacobi equations in nested domains, see [5, 2, 6, 15].
We now give an affirmative answer to Question 2 for all n ≥ 2.
Theorem 1.6. Assume n ≥ 2, and Z = X \ B1. Fix r > 0 sufficiently small. Let
Vr be the maximal Lipschitz continuous solution to (1.10). For each η > 0, let V
η
r
be the maximal Lipschitz continuous solution to (1.11). Then V ηr → Vr uniformly
on Xr as η → 0.
Organization of the paper. The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we
give a proof of Theorem 1.4. We study properties of Hη, Lη and H and give some
preparation results for the general case in Section 3. The proof of Theorem 1.6 is
given in Section 4. Some conclusions are discussed in Section 5.
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2. The case of two equilibria
We recall the setting here for clarity. Let e1, e2 be the standard basis of R
2. Then,
X = {x1e1 + x2e2 : x1, x2 ≥ 0, x1 + x2 = 1} .
For x, y ∈ X , we write x ≤ y if x1 ≤ y1. Of course, X is 1-dimensional, and we
interpret that
Y = TX = R20 =
{
u ∈ R2 : u1 + u2 = 0
}
.
We write
A1−2 = (α,−β)
for some α, β > 0. Then
B1 = {x ∈ X : A1−2x ≥ 0} =
{
x ∈ X : x1 ≥
β
α + β
}
and
B2 = {x ∈ X : A2−1x ≥ 0} =
{
x ∈ X : x1 ≤
β
α + β
}
.
The Hamiltonian H : X × Y → R has the following formula
H(x, u) = max
i,j
(uj −Υj(Ax)− ui) ∨ 0.
For η > 0, the formula of Hη is
Hη(x, u) = η log

∑
i,j
xie
uj−ui
η
e
Ajx
η∑
k e
Akx
η


Proof of Theorem 1.4. We need to understand about the zero level set of H and
zero sublevel set of Hη, which give us formulas for V and V η.
Let p = u1 − u2. For x ∈ B
1,
H(x,−u) = max{0, u2 − u1, u1 − u2 − A
1−2x}
= max{0,−p, p− A1−2x},
which gives us the explicit form of zero set
N(x) = {p ∈ R : H(x,−u) = 0} =
[
0, A1−2x
]
. (2.1)
By using this and the maximality of V , we get that V (x) = 0 for x ∈ Z, and, for
x ∈ B1,
V (x) =
∫ x1
β
α+β
A1−2(se1 + (1− s)e2) ds. (2.2)
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Next, for η > 0 and x ∈ B1, denote by Nη(x) = {p ∈ R : Hη(x,−u) ≤ 0}. It is
clear that Hη(x,−u) ≤ 0 if and only if∑
i,j
xie
ui−uj
η e
Ajx
η ≤
∑
k
e
Akx
η
⇐⇒ x1
(
e
A1x
η + e
p
η e
A2x
η
)
+ x2
(
e
A2x
η + e
−p
η e
A1x
η
)
≤ e
A1x
η + e
A2x
η
⇐⇒ x1e
p
η e
A2x
η + x2e
−p
η e
A1x
η ≤ x2e
A1x
η + x1e
A2x
η .
One point to notice is that the product of two terms on left hand side is equal
to that of two terms on the right hand side. It is clear that the above inequality
becomes equality if p = 0. The other case that equality happens is when
x1e
p
η e
A2x
η = x2e
A1x
η
⇐⇒ p = A1−2x+ η(log x2 − log x1).
For each η > 0 small, there exists δη ∈ (0, 1) such that
A1−2(δηe1 + (1− δη)e2) + η(log(1− δη)− log δη) = 0
⇐⇒ (α + β)δη + η log
(
1− δη
δη
)
= β,
and limη→0 δη = 1. Therefore, for x ∈ B
1 with x1 ≤ δη,
Nη(x) =
[
0, A1−2x+ η(log x2 − log x1)
]
.
And, for x ∈ B1 with x1 ≥ δη,
0 ∈ Nη(x) ⊂ (−∞, 0].
Based on these, we have the following explicit formula for V η. Surely, V η = 0 on
Z. For x ∈ B1 such that β
α+β
≤ x1 ≤ δη,
V η(x) =
∫ x1
β
α+β
(
A1−2(se1 + (1− s)e2) + η(log(1− s)− log s)
)
ds.
And, V η(x) = V η(δηe1 + (1− δη)e2)) for δη ≤ x1 ≤ 1.
Thus, V η = V = 0 on Z. For x ∈ B1 such that β
α+β
≤ x1 ≤ δη,
|V η(x)− V (x)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ x1
β
α+β
η(log(1− s)− log s) ds
∣∣∣∣∣
= η
∣∣∣∣(−s log s− (1− s) log(1− s))∣∣∣x1
s= β
α+β
∣∣∣∣ ≤ Cη.
For x ∈ B1 such that δη ≤ x1 ≤ 1,
|V η(x)− V (x)|
= |V η(δηe1 + (1− δη)e2))− V (δηe1 + (1− δη)e2)) + V (δηe1 + (1− δη)e2))− V (x)|
≤Cη + C(1− δη).
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e1e2
Z = B2 B1
V η(e1)
V (e1)
Figure 2.1. Graph of V η (dashed curve) and V (solid curve)
Hence, we conclude that
‖V η − V ‖∞ ≤ Cη + C(1− δη)→ 0 as η → 0.

Remark 2. In the above proof, we see that, for δη ≤ x1 ≤ 1,{
Nη(x) = [A1−2x+ η(log x2 − log x1), 0] ,
limx1→1− (A
1−2x+ η(log x2 − log x1)) = −∞.
This shows that Hη behaves in a quite singular way as x1 → 1
−. In particular,
when x1 = 1, that is, x = e1, we have
Hη(e1,−u) = H
η(e1, p) = η log

eA
1e1
η + e
p
η e
A2e1
η
e
A1e1
η + e
A2e1
η

 .
It is clear that Hη(e1, p) > 0 for p > 0, H
η(e1, 0) = 0, and H
η(e1, p) < 0 for p < 0.
Moreover,
lim
p→−∞
Hη(e1, p) = η log

 eA
1e1
η
e
A1e1
η + e
A2e1
η

 ≥ η log(1
2
)
= −η log 2.
Thus, Hη is not coercive on X . A careful computation gives us that
lim
η→0
Hη(e1,−u) = lim
η→0
Hη(e1, p) = max{0, p−A
1−2e1} 6= H(e1, p).
We only have that, for each compact subset X1 of X
◦, Hη is uniformly coercive
on X1, that is,
lim
|p|→∞
inf
η∈(0,1)
min
x∈X1
Hη(x, p) = +∞;
and Hη → H uniformly on X1 × BR as η → 0 for each given R > 0.
Remark 3. It is clear from the above proof that it also gives a proof to Theorem
1.6 in case n = 2.
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3. The general case – Preparation steps
In this section, assumptions of Theorems 1.5 and 1.6 are always in charge.
3.1. Some analysis on properties of Hη, Lη, and H. It is clear that in order
to answer Questions 1 and 2, we need to have a deeper understanding of Hη, Lη,
and H in this logit choice protocol.
Recall that X is the convex hull of {e1, e2, . . . , en}, the standard basis of R
n. For
each r > 0 sufficiently small, Xr is the convex hull of {y1, y2, . . . , yn}. Besides,
Y =
{
u ∈ Rn :
n∑
i=1
ui = 0
}
=
{
p ∈ Rn−1 : p = (u2 − u1, . . . , un − u1)
}
.
Although it is not standard, we write p = (p2, . . . , pn) to make things consistent in
terms of notions, that is, pi = ui − u1 for 2 ≤ i ≤ n. By abuse of notions, we write
Hη(x, u) = Hη(x, p), H(x, u) = H(x, p).
Lemma 3.1. For each r > 0 sufficiently small, Hη is uniformly coercive on Xr,
that is,
lim
|p|→∞
inf
η∈(0,1)
min
x∈Xr
Hη(x, p) = +∞. (3.1)
Proof. Recall that
Hη(x, u) = Hη(x, p) = η log

∑
i,j
xie
uj−ui
η
e
Ajx
η∑
k e
Akx
η

 .
We only need to consider the case where x ∈ B1 ∩ Xr as other cases can be done
analogously. For each 2 ≤ j ≤ n, it is clear that
Hη(x, p) ≥ η log

x1euj−u1η e
Ajx
η
ne
A1x
η

 = pj − A1−jx+ η(log x1 − log n);
and
Hη(x, p) ≥ η log

xjeu1−ujη e
A1x
η
ne
A1x
η

 = −pj + η(log xj − logn).
Therefore, we arrive at
Hη(x, p) ≥ max
2≤j≤n
{
pj − A
1−jx+ η(log r − log n),−pj + η(log r − log n)
}
≥
1
n− 1
|p| − max
2≤j≤n
A1−jx+ η(log r − log n),
which gives (3.1). 
In the above proof, for x ∈ B1∩Xr, we really need to use the property that xj ≥ r
to have that log xj ≥ log r, which is important in our uniform coercivity claim. For
Hamilton-Jacobi equations, uniform coercivity yields Lipschitz estimates, which are
essential in our analysis.
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As x → e1, we have that xj → 0 for 2 ≤ j ≤ n, and log xj → −∞. As a result,
we lose uniform coercivity of Hη in X◦ as follows.
Lemma 3.2. Hη is not coercive at x = e1, and is not uniformly coercive in X
◦.
Proof. We first show that Hη is not coercive at x = e1. Fix x = e1, and u¯ =
(0,−1,−1, . . . ,−1), which means that p = (−1,−1, . . . ,−1). For s > 0, we see that
Hη(e1, su¯) = H
η(e1, sp) = η log

eA
1e1
η +
∑
j>1 e
Aje1
η e
−s
η∑
k e
Ake1
η

 < η log 1 = 0,
and
Hη(e1, su¯) = η log

eA
1e1
η +
∑
j>1 e
Aje1
η e
−s
η∑
k e
Ake1
η

 ≥ η log

 eA1e1η∑
k e
Ake1
η

 > −η log n.
Thus, for s > 0,
−η log n < Hη(e1, sp) < 0,
and
lim
s→∞
Hη(e1, sp) = η log

 eA1e1η∑
k e
Ake1
η

 ∈ (−η log n, 0).
Let us show that Hη is not uniformly coercive as x → ∂X , which means that
the maximal solution V η has complicated behavior near the boundary. In a similar
fashion, for x ∈ X , we can estimate that
Hη(x, sp) ≤ η log
(
x1 +
∑
j>1
xje
s
η
)
= η log(1 + (1− x1)(e
s
η − 1)) ≤ (1− x1)η(e
s
η − 1).
We use the fact that log(1 + r) ≤ r for r ≥ 0 in the last inequality above. So,
clearly, as x→ e1, we have 1− x1 → 0, and thus,
lim sup
x→e1
Hη(x, sp) ≤ 0.

Proposition 3.3. For each r > 0 sufficiently small, Hη → H uniformly on Xr×Y
as η → 0. However, Hη does not converge to H locally uniformly on X × Y as
η → 0.
Proof. Fix r > 0 sufficiently small. We only need to consider the case where x ∈
B1 ∩Xr as other cases can be done analogously. For each i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, it is
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clear that
Hη(x, u) = η log

∑
i,j
xie
uj−ui
η
e
Ajx
η∑
k e
Akx
η


≥ η log

xieuj−uiη e
Ajx
η
ne
A1x
η

 = uj − ui − A1−jx+ η(log xi − log n)
≥ uj − ui −A
1−jx+ η(log r − logn).
In particular, for i = j = 1, we see that Hη(x, u) ≥ η(log r − logn). Thus, take
maximum over i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} in the above inequalities to deduce that
Hη(x, u) ≥ H(x, u) + η(log r − log n). (3.2)
To get the other bound, we assume that H(x, u) = uk − ul − A
1−kx for some
k, l ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. This means that, for all i, j ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
uk − ul + A
kx ≥ uj − ui + A
jx.
Therefore,
Hη(x, u) = η log

∑
i,j
xie
uj−ui
η
e
Ajx
η∑
k e
Akx
η


≤ η log

∑
i,j
xie
uk−ul
η
e
Akx
η
e
A1x
η

 = uk − ul − A1−kx+ η log n
= H(x, u) + η log n.
Combine this with (3.2), we arrive at
‖Hη −H‖L∞(Xr×Y ) ≤ η(| log r|+ logn) = η(logn− log r). (3.3)
Therefore, Hη → H uniformly on Xr×Y as η → 0. However, H
η does not converge
to H locally uniformly on X × Y as η → 0 thanks to Lemma 3.2. 
We also include here a different proof showing that Lη(x, ·) blows up as x→ ∂X
in certain directions (see inequality (31) in [11]).
Lemma 3.4. For x ∈ X◦ and i 6= j,
Lη(x, ej − ei) ≥ −η log xi − η log 2.
In particular, Lη(x, ej − ei)→ +∞ as xi → 0.
Proof. Without loss of generality, we consider i = 2, j = 1. By the Legendre
transform,
Lη(x, e1 − e2) = sup
u∈Y
((e1 − e2) · u−H
η(x, u))
≥ sup
u∈Y
(
(u1 − u2)− η log
(∑
i,j
xie
uj−ui
η
))
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Pick u1 = k, u2 = −k, and uj = 0 for j > 2. For k > 0 sufficiently large depending
on x, it is clear that∑
i,j
xie
uj−ui
η ≤ x2e
2k
η +
∑
i,j
xie
k
η = x2e
2k
η + ne
k
η < 2x2e
2k
η .
Thus, for k > 0 sufficiently large,
Lη(x, e1 − e2) ≥ 2k − η log
(
2x2e
2k
η
)
= −η log(2x2) = −η log x2 − η log 2.

Denote by cη(x, y) the minimum cost of traveling from x to y using the Lagrangian
Lη, that is,
cη(x, y) = inf
{∫ T
0
Lη(φ(s), φ˙(s)) ds : φ ∈ ΦT for some T ≥ 0,
φ(0) = x, φ(T ) = y
}
.
Lemma 3.5. For 0 < η < 1 and 0 < r < 1
2(n−1)
sufficiently small, there exists a
constant C > 0 depending only on n and A such that
cη(e1, y1) = c
η(e1, y1(r)) ≤ Cr.
Proof. For each x ∈ B1 and 2 ≤ j ≤ n, by the Legendre transform,
Lη(x, ej − e1) = sup
u∈Y
((ej − e1) · u−H
η(x, u))
≤ sup
u∈Y

(uj − u1)− η log

x1euj−u1η e
Ajx
η
ne
A1x
η




= A1−jx+ η(log n− log x1).
Let v¯ = (e2 + · · ·+ en)/(n− 1)− e1. By convexity of L
η(x, ·),
Lη(x, v¯) ≤
1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
Lη(x, ej − e1) ≤
1
n− 1
n∑
j=2
A1−jx+ η(logn− log x1)
≤ A1x+ η(log n− log x1).
Denote by
γ(s) = e1 + sv¯ for s ∈ [0, (n− 1)r].
Then, γ(0) = e1, γ((n− 1)r) = y1 = y1(r), and
cη(e1, y1(r)) ≤
∫ (n−1)r
0
Lη(γ(s), γ˙(s)) ds
≤ (n− 1)r
(
max
x∈B1
A1x
)
+ ηr(n− 1) (log n− log(1− (n− 1)r))
≤ C(1 + η)r ≤ Cr

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Thus, cη(e1, y1(r)) ≤ Cr, which means that the cost of transitioning from e1 to
y1(r) is small enough of order O(r), and is vanishing as r → 0. This gives another
evident that it makes sense to consider the problem in the restricted simplex Xr in
place of X .
We now study about the zero level set of H , which is essential in our analysis
later.
Lemma 3.6. Fix x ∈ B1, and denote by
N(x) = {u ∈ Y : H(x, u) = 0} = {p ∈ Rn−1 : H(x, p) = 0}.
Then,
N(x) = [0, A1−2x]× · · · × [0, A1−nx].
Proof. For x ∈ B1 ∩Xr, we have
H(x, u) = max
i,j
(uj −Υj(Ax)− ui) ∨ 0
= max
i,j
(
uj −A
1−jx− ui
)
∨ 0.
For i = 1 and j > 1, we see that
uj −A
1−jx− u1 = pj − A
1−jx.
For j = 1 and i > 1, we have that
u1 − A
1−1x− ui = −pi.
For i, j > 1,
uj −A
1−jx− ui = (uj − u1 − A
1−jx)− (ui − u1) = pj −A
1−jx− pi.
We use the three identities above to deduce that
N(x) =
{
p ∈ Rn−1 : p2 ∈ [0, A
1−2x], . . . , pn ∈ [0, A
1−nx]
}
.

3.2. Preparation results.
Proposition 3.7. Fix r > 0 sufficiently small. There exists a sequence {ηk} → 0
such that V ηkr → V¯ locally uniformly in X
◦, where V¯ solves (1.10).
Proof. Thanks to (3.1), Hη is uniformly coercive on Xr, that is,
lim
|p|→∞
inf
η∈(0,1)
min
x∈Xr
Hη(x, p) = +∞;
and Hη → H uniformly on Xr × BR as η → 0 for each given R > 0. Therefore,
there exists C = C(r) > 0 such that
‖DV ηr ‖L∞(Xr) ≤ C(r). (3.4)
Since V ηr = 0 on Z and Xr is compact, we imply that, there exists a constant
C = C(r) > 0 independent of η such that
‖V ηr ‖L∞(Xr) + ‖DV
η
r ‖L∞(Xr) ≤ C(r). (3.5)
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Thanks to (3.5), we use the Arzela`-Ascoli theorem to find a sequence {ηk} → 0
such that V ηkr → V¯ uniformly on Xr. It is clear that V¯ satisfies the bound (3.5) as
well.
We now need to show that V¯ is a solution to (1.10). Surely V¯ = 0 on Z. The
subsolution test follows the classical argument on stability of viscosity subsolutions.
Let us present it here anyway for the sake of completeness.
Take a smooth test function ϕ such that V¯ −ϕ has a strict maximum at y ∈ X◦r \Z.
Take s > 0 such that Bs(y) ⊂ X
◦
r \Z. As V
ηk
r → V uniformly onXr, for k sufficiently
large, we have that V ηkr −ϕ has a local maximum at yk ∈ Bs(y), and limk→∞ yk = y.
Since V ηkr − ϕ has a local maximum at yk ∈ Bs(y), by the definition of viscosity
subsolutions to (1.9),
Hηk(yk,−Dϕ(yk)) ≤ 0.
As ϕ is smooth and Hηk → H locally uniformly on Xr × Y , we let k → ∞ in the
above to get
H(y,−Dϕ(y)) = lim
k→∞
Hηk(yk,−Dϕ(yk)) ≤ 0.

Proposition 3.7 is an important step towards answering a main question in our
paper, Question 2. Nevertheless, it is not enough to conclude here as we do not
know yet whether V¯ is the maximal solution to (1.10) or not. As it was shown
in [12], (1.10) has infinitely many solutions, and any convex combination of two
solutions is again a solution, which means that we need deeper understanding of
the situations to get the maximality. In the next section, we need to do a delicate
and deeper analysis to yield the maximality property.
We next show that Vr to V locally uniformly in X
◦ as r → 0.
Proof of Theorem 1.5. By repeating the same proof to that of Proposition 3.7, there
exists a subsequence {rk} → 0 such that Vrk → V¯ locally uniformly in X
◦, V¯ solves
(1.8) and
V¯ ≤ V. (3.6)
We just need to obtain the reverse inequality. This is, in fact, not so hard to see.
For each k ∈ N, V is a solution to (1.10) with r = rk. Hence,
V ≤ Vrk on Xrk .
Let k →∞ in the above to imply that, for each r > 0,
V ≤ V¯ on Xr. (3.7)
Combine (3.6) and (3.7) to conclude.

In fact, in the above proof, we have shown that Vr → V locally uniformly in X
◦
in a decreasing way.
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4. Proof of Theorem 1.6
4.1. The case of three equilibria. The situation in this case is quite complicated
because of the two dimensional topology of X . We choose to do the case n = 3 first
to show our ideas clearly. The general case is done in a similar manner afterwards.
Proof of Theorem 1.6 in case n = 3. Again, we need to investigate the zero level set
of H and zero sublevel set of Hη first. By Lemma 3.6, for x ∈ B1, we have that
N(x) = {p ∈ R2 : H(x, p) = 0} = [0, A1−2x]× [0, A1−3x].
First, fix δ > 0 small enough and θ ∈ (1/2, 1) such that θ is close to 1. Denote by
D =
{
x ∈ B1 ∩Xr : Vr(x) ≤ δ
}
.
For x ∈ (B1 ∩Xr) \D, we see that there exists δ¯ > 0 such that
min{A1−2x,A1−3x} ≥ δ¯.
Let Nη(x) = {p ∈ R2 : Hη(x, p) ≤ 0}. We compute that Hη(x, p) ≤ 0 if and only if∑
i,j
xie
uj−ui
η e
Ajx
η ≤
∑
k
e
Akx
η
⇐⇒
(
x1e
u2−u1
η e
A2x
η + x2e
u1−u2
η e
A1x
η
)
+
(
x1e
u3−u1
η e
A3x
η + x3e
u1−u3
η e
A1x
η
)
+
(
x2e
u3−u2
η e
A3x
η + x3e
u2−u3
η e
A2x
η
)
≤
(
x2e
A1x
η + x1e
A2x
η
)
+
(
x1e
A3x
η + x3e
A1x
η
)
+
(
x2e
A3x
η + x3e
A2x
η
)
.
It is useful to compare each pair in brackets on left hand side with its corresponding
pair on right hand side. We find particular points that are in Nη(x). First, 0 ∈
Nη(x). Second, p ∈ Nη(x) where{
p2 = u2 − u1 = A
1−2x+ η(log x2 − log x1),
p3 = u3 − u1 = A
1−3x+ η(log x3 − log x1).
Third, for q ∈ R2 with q2 = u2 − u1 = 0, q3 = u3 − u1 = θA
1−3x, we see that the
first brackets on both sides are the same, and(
x1e
u3−u1
η e
A3x
η + x3e
u1−u3
η e
A1x
η
)
+
(
x2e
u3−u2
η e
A3x
η + x3e
u2−u3
η e
A2x
η
)
≤ (x1 + x2 + 2x3)e
A3x+θA1−3x
η ≤ 2e
A3x+θA1−3x
η ≤ x3e
A1x
η
≤
(
x1e
A3x
η + x3e
A1x
η
)
+
(
x2e
A3x
η + x3e
A2x
η
)
,
provided that η(log 2 − log x3) ≤ (1 − θ)δ¯, which is used in the last inequality of
line 2 in the computation right above. So q ∈ Nη(x) for η > 0 sufficiently small
such that η(log 2− log r) ≤ (1− θ)δ¯. Similarly, for w ∈ R2 with w3 = u3 − u1 = 0,
w2 = u2 − u1 = θA
1−2x, we have w ∈ Nη(x).
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Therefore, for η > 0 such that η(log 2− log r) ≤ (1− θ)δ¯, we get that the convex
hull of {0, p, q, w} is a subset of Nη(x). Thus, for η small enough,
θN(x) ⊂ Nη(x). (4.1)
Define
ϕθ(x) =
{
0 for x ∈ Z ∪D,
θ(Vr(x)− δ) for x ∈ (B
1 ∩Xr) \D.
Then Dϕθ(x) = 0 for x ∈ (Z ∪D)◦, and if Vr is differentiable at x ∈ (B
1 ∩Xr) \D
then
Dϕθ(x) = θDVr(x) ∈ θN(x) ⊂ N
η(x).
Thus, for η > 0 small enough, ϕθ is a solution to (1.11). We yield V ηr ≥ ϕ
θ. Combine
this with Proposition 3.7 to imply, for any sequence {ηk} → 0 such that V
ηk
r → V¯
uniformly on Xr,
V¯ ≥ ϕθ.
We get the desired result by letting θ → 1 and δ → 0 in this order. 
4.2. The general case.
Proof of Theorem 1.6 in case n ≥ 3. By Lemma 3.6, for x ∈ B1, we have that
N(x) = {p ∈ Rn−1 : H(x, p) = 0} = [0, A1−2x]× [0, A1−3x]×· · ·× [0, A1−nx].
First, fix δ > 0 small enough and θ ∈ (1/2, 1) such that θ is close to 1. Denote by
D =
{
x ∈ B1 ∩Xr : Vr(x) ≤ δ
}
.
For x ∈ (B1 ∩Xr) \D, we see that there exists δ¯ > 0 such that
min{A1−2x,A1−3x, . . . , A1−nx} ≥ δ¯.
Let Nη(x) = {p ∈ Rn−1 : Hη(x, p) ≤ 0}. By repeating the same analysis as in the
above proof in a careful manner, for η > 0 such that η(log 2− log r) ≤ (1− θ)δ¯,
θN(x) ⊂ Nη(x).
Define
ϕθ(x) =
{
0 for x ∈ Z ∪D,
θ(Vr(x)− δ) for x ∈ (B
1 ∩Xr) \D.
Then Dϕθ(x) = 0 for x ∈ (Z ∪D)◦, and if Vr is differentiable at x ∈ (B
1 ∩Xr) \D
then
Dϕθ(x) = θDVr(x) ∈ θN(x) ⊂ N
η(x).
Thus, for η > 0 small enough, ϕθ is a solution to (1.11). We yield V ηr ≥ ϕ
θ. Combine
this with Proposition 3.7 to imply, for any sequence {ηk} → 0 such that V
ηk
r → V¯
uniformly on Xr,
V¯ ≥ ϕθ.
We get the desired result by letting θ → 1 and δ → 0 in this order. 
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We immediately get the following corollary.
Corollary 4.1. Assume n ≥ 2, and Z = X \ B1. For each η > 0 sufficiently small,
pick rη > 0 so that limη→0 rη = limη→0 η log rη = 0. Let V be the maximal Lipschitz
continuous solution to (1.8). For each η > 0, let V η be the maximal Lipschitz
continuous solution to (1.11) with r = rη. Then V
η → V locally uniformly on X◦
as η → 0.
The proof of Corollary 4.1 follows exactly the same lines as that of Theorem 1.6
and hence is omitted. A key point that we need here is
lim
η→0
η(log 2− log rη) = 0,
and therefore, for each θ ∈ (1/2, 1) and δ¯ > 0, there exists η0 > 0 such that
η(log 2− log rη) ≤ (1− θ)δ¯ for all η ∈ (0, η0).
5. Conclusions
We have completely answered Question 2 by Theorem 1.6. Besides, Theorem
1.5 gives us that Vr → V locally uniformly in X
◦, which shows that it is quite
reasonable to consider the problems in a restricted simplex Xr for r > 0 sufficiently
small and pass to the limit if necessary. This is also of practical use.
For Question 1, we have only the affirmative answer when n = 2, and this was
proved earlier in [8]. The question is still open for n ≥ 3. As Hη and Lη have quite
singular behavior near ∂X for each η > 0, it seems that one needs to study finer
properties of Hη, Lη in order to proceed further. For example, it is not clear at all
if V η, the maximal solution to (1.9), is globally Lipschitz on X or not.
Here, we have addressed Questions 1–2 concerning the target problem with a
fixed target Z = X \ B1. Other selection problems with different targets should be
considered and analyzed. Besides, selection problems for the source problem should
also be studied in the near future.
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